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From the Lab to the Field:
Cooperation among FishermenJan StoopErasmus University Rotterdam
Charles N. Noussair
Tilburg University and Center for Economic Research
Daan van Soest
VU University Amsterdam, Tilburg University, and Center for Economic ResearchWe conduct a field experiment to measure cooperation among groups
of recreational fishermen at a privately owned fishing facility. Group
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© 2012earnings are greater when groupmembers catch fewer fish. Consistent
with classical economic theory, though in contrast to prior results from
laboratory experiments, we find no cooperation. A series of additional
treatments identifies causes of the difference. We rule out the subject
pool and the laboratory setting as potential causes and identify the
type of activity involved as the source of the lack of cooperation in our
field experiment. When cooperation requires reducing fishing effort,
individuals are not cooperative.ntroductionA large literature in experimental economics has focused on the extent
to which individuals cooperate in social dilemmas. Social dilemmas are
group interactions in which an individual maximizes his own payoff
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when he does not cooperate but attaining the social optimum requires
cooperation. One experimental paradigm commonly employed to study
1028 journal of political economysocial dilemmas is the voluntary contribution mechanism ðVCMÞ. In a
canonical version of this game, each member of a group receives an
endowment of money. The members of the group then simultaneously
choose to contribute any portion of their endowment to a group ac-
count. Contributions to the group account benefit all members of the
group. The trade-offs are specified so that each individual has a domi-
nant strategy ðassuming selfish preferencesÞ to place his entire endow-
ment in his private account, but the social optimum is attained only if all
individuals contribute their entire endowment to the group account.
Thus, classical economic theory, which maintains the assumptions of
exclusively self-interested motivation and rational decision making,
predicts that all individuals allocate their entire endowments to their
private accounts.1 The percentage of endowment placed in the group
account can be readily interpreted as a measure of cooperation.
The behavior of individuals who repeatedly play the VCM has been
shown to exhibit two robust patterns ðfor a survey, see Ledyard ½1995Þ.
The first pattern is that individuals’ initial average contributions to the
group account are significantly different from both zero and 100 per-
cent of their endowment. This reveals positive, but less than full, coop-
eration on the part of the average individual entering a new social di-
lemma. The second pattern is that a decline in the level of cooperation
occurs as the game is repeated ðsee, e.g., Isaac, McCue, and Plott 1985;
Andreoni 1988; Isaac and Walker 1988bÞ. The two patterns found in the
laboratory are interpreted as evidence that behavior of individuals is
systematically different from that of self-interested rational agents. Ex-
plaining these patterns has been a focus of a number of models. The
positive level of cooperation at the outset of interaction is one of the
stylized facts motivating the modeling of other-regarding preferences
ðRabin 1993; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; An-
dreoni and Samuelson 2006Þ, in particular, the inclusion of social wel-
fare in individuals’ objective functions ðCharness and Rabin 2002Þ. The
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1 If the game is repeated a finite number of times, the only subgame-perfect equilibrium
is for each individual to place his entire endowment in his private account in every period,
regardless of the history of play. The social optimum requires all individuals to place their
entire endowment in the group account in every period.
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decline in cooperation with repetition of the game has been interpreted
as a reduction of errors over time ðAndreoni 1995; Palfrey and Prisbey
from the lab to the field 10291996;Houser andKurzban 2002Þ, as reputation building ðAndreoni 1988;
Sonnemans, Schram, and Offerman 1999; Brandts and Schram 2001Þ,
and as a result of a self-serving bias accompanying conditional coopera-
tion ðNeugebauer et al. 2009Þ.
In this paper, we consider whether these two patterns appear in a
framed field experimental environment. The setting of our field ex-
periment is a privately owned fishing pond where recreational fisher-
men can catch rainbow trout. We create a social dilemma similar in
structure to the VCM. The fishermen are assigned to anonymous groups
of four persons, who interact for six 40-minute periods. In each period,
each fisherman is allowed to catch a maximum of two fish, which are his
to keep. However, for each fish an individual forgoes catching, each of
the three other members of the group receives a cash payment. Thus, a
social dilemma is created in that each individual has a dominant strategy
to catch two fish in each period, while the social optimum requires all
individuals to forgo their catches. Cooperation measures are derived
from the actual catch of fish, and from the effort made to catch fish,
relative to a control treatment in which no collective incentives exist to
reduce the catch of fish. Recruitment of subjects takes place 2 weeks in
advance of the sessions, so that subjects do not come to the experiment
with the expectation that they would necessarily fish for their own
benefit and enjoyment as they would on a typical day.
As described in Section II, we find strong support for classical eco-
nomic theory in our field experiment. There is no evidence of cooper-
ation, even in the initial periods. Beginning in the first period, and
continuing throughout the sessions, fishermen in the treatment with
group-level gains from cooperation fish with the same effort and catch
the same average number of fish as those in the treatment without such
potential gains. To explore the source of the difference between our
setting and received results from the laboratory, we conduct four ad-
ditional treatments, which are described and reported in Sections III
and IV.
These four treatments establish that the discrepancy in cooperation is
not due to the fact that ðiÞ the framing is contextualized in the field
experiment, ðiiÞ the subject pool differs, ðiiiÞ the field experiment is
conducted in a natural rather than in a structured laboratory setting, or
ðivÞ the group benefits and private costs of cooperation are denomi-
nated in terms of different units ðmoney and fishÞ in the field experi-
ment. Rather, the data from these treatments suggest that the key dif-
ference between the laboratory and our field setting is the decision
variable, the activity that must be undertaken in order to cooperate.
When cooperation requires a reduction of fishing, an activity that par-This content downloaded from 130.37.129.78 on Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:39:10 AM
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ticipants presumably particularly enjoy, individual behavior conforms to
classical economic theory, and there is no cooperation. This is inde-
1030 journal of political economypendent of whether the reduction in catch results in more money—as is
the case in the field experiment described above—or in more fishing
opportunities for the group.
Our framed field experiment can be viewed as a test of the robustness
of an artifactual field experiment in the sense of Harrison and List
ð2004Þ. This is the case because we observe members of the same non-
student pool of subjects in the laboratory, as well as in the field,
performing a similar task. We characterize the relationship between our
artifactual and framed field experiments as similar rather than identical
because by necessity some differences exist in the two implementations.
Thus the notion of external validity that is evaluated is whether the
behavior in an artifactual field experiment carries over to a closely re-
lated framed field experiment. Several other field experiments have
documented a positive relationship between individuals’ cooperative-
ness in an experimental VCM game and prosocial behavior in another
activity ðsee, e.g., Cardenas 2004; Henrich et al. 2004; Laury and Tay-
lor 2005; Ruffle and Sosis 2007; Benz and Meier 2008; Carpenter and
Seki 2011; Fehr and Leibbrandt 2011Þ. However, there are other studies
that do not find such a relationship. For example, Karlan ð2005Þ and List
ð2006Þ find that subjects act more cooperatively in laboratory settings
than they do outside the laboratory. These latter papers suggest that the
laboratory may not always be well suited to test the effectiveness of policy
interventions to promote cooperation. Here, we also find that cooper-
ative behavior in an artifactual field experiment does not carry over to a
similar field setting, in this case a framed field experiment.2
Levitt and List ð2007, 2008Þ have taken the view that social preferences
appear with different prominence in the laboratory and in field settings.
Our results are consistent with this view. Furthermore, for the particular
2 Our work bears a relation to a number of other field experiments that focus on co-
operation. An active literature is investigating influences on charitable giving ðList and
Lucking-Reiley 2002; Frey andMeier 2004; Alpizar, Carlsson, and Johansson-Stenman 2008;
Croson and Shang 2008; Martin and Randal 2008Þ. Another strand of research uses arti-
factual field methods to study behavior of nonstudent subject pools in the VCM game ðBarr
2001Þ, and a closely related paradigm, the common pool resource game ðsee, e.g., Car-
denas 2003, 2004; Cardenas and Ostrom 2004; Rodriguez-Sickert, Guzma´n, and Cardenas
2008Þ. These studies all find positive cooperation in the VCM game among the subject
pools studied. The available evidence from framed and natural field experiments is mixed.
Erev, Bornstein, and Galili ð1993Þ find considerable evidence of free-riding when students
pick oranges under team incentives. When groups act individually, subjects pick 30 percent
fewer oranges than when a bonus is given to the group with the highest output. In a one-
shot social dilemma setting in a restaurant, Gneezy, Haruvy, and Yafe ð2004Þ find that
students choose more expensive meals when the costs are split with five other students than
when each pays for her own meal and, thus, exhibit a considerable tendency toward free
riding. Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul ð2005Þ report a substantial degree of cooperation in a
fruit-picking firm, but only when the subjects are able to monitor each other.
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game we study, we are able to identify several distinct sources of differ-
ences in cooperativeness between the laboratory and the field. Our
from the lab to the field 1031fishermen exhibit more cooperation than student subjects whenmaking
decisions in a laboratory environment, fishermen display more coop-
eration when making decisions in a natural environment than in a lab-
oratory setting, and making the fishing task real rather than virtual re-
duces cooperation. Nevertheless, the absence of cooperation in our
framed field experiment can be attributed only to differences between
the real and virtual fishing tasks, since the effects of subject pool and of
the structured laboratory setting operate in the opposite direction.
Wemake no claims that our field experiment is any more generic than
the traditional experiment conducted in the laboratory or that com-
mercial fishermen would necessarily behave similarly to recreational
fishermen. Rather, we claim only to support the contention that the
typical empirical pattern observed in a common laboratory implemen-
tation of a social dilemma is not universal and that the behavior of
nonstudent subjects in a contextualized laboratory experiment is not
necessarily predictive of their behavior in the field.
II. The VCM Experiment in the FieldThe first pair of treatments we describe consist of a field implementation
of the voluntary contributions mechanism and a control treatment. The
treatments, which constitute a framed field experiment in the sense of
Harrison and List ð2004Þ, are described in subsection A. In subsections B
and C we consider methodological issues that arise under our design.
We present the analysis of the data in subsection D.
A. The Setting, Game, and Experimental DesignThe sessions were conducted at a commercial trout fishing facility called
De Biestse Oevers, located in the village of Biest-Houtakker.3 This village
lies in close proximity to Tilburg, in Noord-Brabant province, in the
south of the Netherlands. De Biestse Oevers is privately owned and
comprises three separate fishing ponds with surface areas of about
12,000 square feet each. One of these ponds served as the venue for our
experiment. On a typical day, when no experiment is taking place, a cus-
tomer can fish for 4 hours for €12.50. The pond has space for 20 fish-
ermen at a time. For each paying customer, four rainbow trout are put
into the pond ðfor an extra fee, salmon trout, a larger variety of trout, can
also be thrown inÞ. There are strict rules regarding the fishing gear and
type of bait that may be used, but a customer is allowed to catch as many
3 See http://www.biestse-oevers.nl for pictures of the site.This content downloaded from 130.37.129.78 on Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:39:10 AM
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fish as possible. Also, because of sanitary considerations with respect to
the remainingfish, any trout caught cannot be thrownback into thepond
1032 journal of political economyand must be taken away from the site ðpresumably homeÞ. Customers
therefore have experience with negative externalities since when an in-
dividual catches a fish he reduces the number of fish available for others.
The typical customer, and hence our typical participant, is Dutch, male,
and over 50 years old.
Participants were recruited for our experiment 2 weeks in advance by
distributing flyers on site that informed customers of the opportunity
to take part in a study conducted by Tilburg University. A maximum of
16 people were allowed to participate in each session.
Two treatments, FieldVCM and FieldPI, were conducted under the
following conditions. A session consisted of six consecutive periods of
40 minutes each and therefore took 4 hours to complete. Within a ses-
sion, each period proceeded under identical rules. Participants were
assigned to groups of four, and group membership remained fixed
throughout the session. Subjects were not informed at any time of the
identity of the other members of their group. At the end of each period,
each participant was informed privately of the total number of fish
caught by his group.
Before a session began, two rainbow trout per participant were put
into the pond plus an additional six trout. For a session with 16 partic-
ipants, we thus threw in 38 rainbow trout. The number of fish we put
into the pond was common knowledge. Before the first period, the
participants were randomly assigned a spot at the pond by picking a
numbered spot tag out of a bag. This random assignment procedure was
repeated before periods 3 and 5. The rotation of positions was intended
to create a degree of procedural fairness since many fishermen believe
that their physical position at the pond influences their probability of
catching a fish.4
Each participant was allowed to catch a maximum of two fish per
period ðrainbow trout or salmon trout, because the latter could still be
present because of previous use of the pondÞ. Any fish caught was his to
keep, as the standard rules and regulations of De Biestse Oevers prohibit
throwing trout back into the pond. At the beginning of each session, we
released 38 trout ðinstead of 32Þ in an attempt to ensure that, at least in
principle, all individuals would be able to catch their quota of two fish
each. Once a participant had caught his maximum quota, he was re-
quired to wait until the next period began to resume fishing. At the
beginning of the next period, a number of trout equal to the total catch
of the previous period was put into the water. Therefore, the total
4 Our data show no actual significant relationship between location and the number of
fish caught, suggesting that this belief may be incorrect or exaggerated; see App. A.
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number of fish in the pond was the same at the beginning of each period
within a given session, and this was explained explicitly to the partici-
from the lab to the field 1033pants. Communication among subjects was strictly prohibited. A show-
up fee of €5 was given at the end of a session.
The above is a complete description of the FieldPI treatment ðprivate
incentives, as there are no externalities in this treatmentÞ; the FieldVCM
treatment differed only in that a social dilemma was created by intro-
ducing group incentives for reducing the number of fish caught within
each group.5 Each fish that a participant did not catch below his maxi-
mum quota of two per period resulted in a cash payment of €2 to each of
the other three group members. Therefore, a participant faced a trade-
off in the FieldVCM treatment between catching a fish for himself and
providing a surplus of €6, to be divided equally among the three other
members of his group. Note that this game differs from the standard VCM
game in that cooperation yields a pure externality; the decision maker
does not get any private return to the investments hemakes. We imposed
this simplification in order to make the social dilemma more obvious to
subjects. At the end of each period, participants in the FieldVCM treat-
ment were informed of the group catch in that period, the amount of
money they had earned in that period, and their cumulative earnings.
The average earnings of a participant in the FieldVCM treatment over
the course of a session equaled €40.67. Note that, in contrast to the
FieldPI treatment, no show-up fee was given in the FieldVCM treatment.
One round of sessions of the FieldPI and FieldVCM treatments was
carried out in June 2008, a second round was conducted in September
and October 2008, and a third round was conducted in May 2012.
Weather conditions affect the difficulty of catching fish. In June 2008 the
water temperature was too high for trout to bite in large numbers,
whereas the conditions were much better in October 2008. Therefore,
the data from June will be described as having been conducted in the
low season and will be designated as the FieldVCML and FieldPIL con-
ditions, while the data gathered in October 2008 will be referred to as
FieldVCMH and FieldPIH, with H denoting high season conditions. In
May 2012, two extra sessions were conducted, denoted FieldVCMScr and
FieldPIScr. The suffix Scr indicates that there was a prior session in
which subjects were screened, as described in subsection B.
The data from each of the three pairs of conditions, L, H, and Scr, are
analyzed separately. All sessions of the field treatments were conducted
5 Informing subjects that they are assigned to groups is awkward in a setting in which
individual outcomes are completely independent of others’ actions. Nevertheless, we
wanted to check whether framing the FieldPI treatment as a group exercise has an impact
on behavior. Therefore, we conducted one of the FieldPI sessions without informing
subjects about any matching procedures. We did not detect any differences in behavior
resulting from the different framing.
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between 8:00 a.m. and noon ðwith the instructions starting at about
7:40 a.m.Þ. Paired FieldVCM and FieldPI sessions were always conducted
1034 journal of political economywithin 1 week of each other.
B. Establishing the Existence of a Social DilemmaIn the FieldVCM treatment, a social dilemma exists if the private benefit
of the right to catch an extra fish is smaller than the total benefit of the
money received by the other three members if that fish is not caught. In
other words, a social dilemma exists if participants value the right to
catch one additional fish at less than €6. At the session level, a social
dilemma exists if the total payoff that we associate with cooperation, €72,
is valued more highly than the option to catch two fish in each of six 40-
minute periods, the outcome resulting from the behavior that we des-
ignate as zero cooperation.
In the FieldVCMScr condition, we ensured that there was a social
dilemma. We conducted preliminary sessions in the months before the
main session took place. In these sessions, we gave subjects the choice
between two options. The first was to fish for 4 hours with a maximum
catch quota of two fish in each of six 40-minute periods. Individuals
who reached their quotas were required to wait until the current 40-
minute period had elapsed before they could fish again. The second
option was to receive €72 and to remain at the fishing site for 4 hours.
During this period, they could not fish at all. Themoney was disbursed at
the end of the 4 hours. We used a random lottery incentive system to
determine if a choice of a fisherman would be implemented. In each
session, one-fourth of the fishermen were randomly selected to have
their decision implemented. The other three-fourths of the fishermen
fished under the normal fishing circumstances at the fishing site: they
could fish unconstrained for 4 hours, and four rainbow trout were put
into the pond for each fisherman. These rules were explained to all
fishermen before they made their choice. As in all of the treatments
reported in this paper, individuals were not informed beforehand of
what the experiment would entail.
Forty-six fishermen participated in the preliminary sessions. Thirty of
the 46 fishermen chose the €72 cash payment over the afternoon of
fishing. This establishes that these 30 individuals prefer the payoff re-
sulting from the behavior we interpret as full cooperation to that re-
sulting from zero cooperation. We then recruited all of the 16 partic-
ipants for the FieldVCMScr treatment exclusively from among these
30 individuals. The session in the FieldVCMScr treatment was conducted
4 weeks after the last preliminary session. Because, as reported in sub-
section D, the data from FieldVCMScr are very similar with regard to the
extent of cooperation to those of the other FieldVCM sessions, we areThis content downloaded from 130.37.129.78 on Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:39:10 AM
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confident that a social dilemma existed in the other FieldVCM sessions
as well.6
from the lab to the field 1035C. Measuring CooperationThe measurement of cooperation in this setting raises methodological
issues that do not usually appear in laboratory experiments. The number
of fish caught depends on exogenous factors, such as weather condi-
tions, as well as on the level of cooperativeness. Here, results obtained in
the FieldPI treatment serve as the noncooperative benchmark, as FieldPI
provides the same incentives to catch the quota of two fish as FieldVCM
does if agents are acting noncooperatively.
Comparing catch in FieldPI and FieldVCM during a given condition
ðL, H, or ScrÞ provides one measure of cooperation. Cooperation cor-
responds to a smaller catch of fish in FieldVCM than in FieldPI in the
same condition. We call the magnitude of this difference the catch mea-
sure of cooperation. The level of cooperation in the FieldVCM treat-
ment in the L condition, according to the catch measure, is thus
Cj 5
1
GPIL o
GPIL
g51
o
4
i51
x FieldPIL
g
it 2 o
i
x FieldVCML
j
it ; ð1Þ
where xit denotes the number of fish caught by subject i in period t,
indices g and j enumerate groups,GPIL and GVCML denote the number
of groups in the FieldPIL and FieldVCML treatments, and Cj is our mea-
6 A payment of €72 would be enough to go fishing for 5 half days at De Biestse Oevers
and have €9.50 remaining or, alternatively, to buy 12 fish in a fishmonger’s shop ðat a price
of €4 per trout, the maximum store price we were able to locateÞ and have €24 remaining.
All participants in FieldVCM and FieldPI are regular customers of the fishing facility and
live in the vicinity. We also conducted a hypothetical survey of members of our subject pool
on a separate date. On a day when no experiments were conducted, 24 fishermen at the site
were surveyed. Using the strategy method, we asked each fisherman how many fish he
would like to catch, given that he would be charged €0.50 for each fish caught. The fishing
facility does not allow throwing back any fish caught, and hence a fisherman’s answers
reflect the monetary value he assigns to the act of fishing and the value of a fish combined.
If a fisherman indicated a nonzero quantity at this price, we asked howmuch he would like
to catch if he would be charged €1 for each fish caught. This procedure was repeated in
increments of €0.50 until a fisherman indicated that the fee exceeded his willingness to pay
for catching just one fish. The data do not permit us to disentangle the value of fishing and
the value of catching fish, but that is not necessary to assess whether a social dilemma exists
in our FieldVCM experiment. The results of the survey are as follows. Four fishermen
indicated that they would not participate in a scheme in which a fee was charged per fish
caught. Therefore, we are not able to derive a maximum willingness to pay for these four
fishermen. The remaining 20 fishermen had an average maximum willingness to pay for
the first fish they catch of €3.50. One fisherman indicated that he was willing to pay €15 to
catch one fish, while another indicated he would pay €6, and the rest indicated a willing-
ness to pay lower than €6. This means that 90 percent of the fishermen had a value of less
than €6 for the act of fishing and the first fish they catch. For all of the fishermen, the
marginal value of each fish beyond the first was always nonincreasing.
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sure of cooperation achieved by group j of the FieldVCML treatment.
Analogous measures are defined for the H and Scr conditions. A value of
1036 journal of political economyC equal to zero would indicate zero cooperation, and a positive level
would indicate the presence of cooperation.
A second measure of cooperation is the number of times an average
fisherman casts his fishing rod per minute. There are several advantages
of this “input” measure of cooperation. First, casting a rod is a conscious
decision of a fisherman. A fisherman can deliberately “work harder” to
catch more fish. In Appendix A, we show that there is a significantly
positive effect of effort on the number of fish caught. Second, effort
yields a less noisy measure of cooperation than catch. Whereas catching
zero fish might be a consequence of bad luck, not casting a rod cannot
be reasonably interpreted in a manner other than as indicating coop-
eration. To measure a group’s cooperation, we take the average number
of casts per minute registered by members of the group in FieldVCM
and compare it to the number in FieldPI, pairing the L, H, and Scr
conditions. If the average is lower in FieldVCM than in FieldPI, we in-
terpret the difference as an indication that cooperation is observed.
We refer to the magnitude of the difference between treatments as the
effort measure of cooperation. The data on casts per minute were gath-
ered by two experimenters continuously scoring the number of casts of
the 16 fishermen at the pond, with each experimenter monitoring eight
individuals. This monitoring increases the level of experimenter scrutiny
in both FieldVCM and FieldPI—a factor that Levitt and List ð2007Þ have
identified as one that fosters prosocial behavior.
D. Results from the FieldVCM TreatmentTable 1 illustrates the structure of the field treatments and indicates the
amount of data available. Unless noted otherwise, in the analysis of the
data we treat the activity of each group of four subjects over an entire
session as one observation. This gives us a minimum of four observations
per treatment.
The catch of fish and level of effort, as measured by the number of
casts per minute, are shown in figures 1 and 2, respectively, for each of
the six treatments. In the two figures, the FieldVCM results for the three
conditions ðH, L, and ScrÞ are indicated by solid lines and those for
FieldPI by dotted lines. Figure 1 shows that the number of fish caught in
any of the three FieldVCM sessions is not lower than that in the cor-
responding FieldPI session. The weather conditions were extremely fa-
vorable for fishing on the day that we implemented FieldVCMScr. De-
spite the fact that participants in FieldVCMScr had revealed, through an
incentivized decision, that they prefer the outcome we associate with
cooperation ðnot fish but receive €72Þ over the one we associate with
noncooperation ðcatching maximally two fish per periodÞ, the numberThis content downloaded from 130.37.129.78 on Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:39:10 AM
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TABLE 1
Number of Groups, Main Feature, Average Earnings, and Average Sum
of Individual Catch in the FieldVCM Treatment and FieldPI Treatment
in the High, Low, and Screened Conditions
Treatment Groups Main Feature
Average
Earnings
Average
Individua
Catch
FieldPIH 4 Determine baseline fishing activity in the
H condition
€5 6.12
FieldPIL 4 Determine baseline fishing activity in the
L condition
€5 1.13
FieldPIScr 4 Determine baseline fishing activity in the
Scr condition
€5 2.88
FieldVCMH 4 Difference from FieldPIH measures coop-
eration in the H condition
€26.63 7.62
FieldVCML 7 Difference from FieldPIL measures coop-
eration in the L condition
€62.71 1.57
FieldVCMScr 4 Difference from FieldPIL measures coop-
eration in the Scr condition
€16.13 9.31
Note.—A show-up fee of €5 was provided in the FieldPI treatment but not in the
FieldVCM treatment.
FIG. 1.—Average group catch by period, FieldVCM and FieldPI ðL, H, and Scr con
ditionsÞ.
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-
of fish caught was at least as great as in the FieldVCMH and FieldVCML
treatments.7 Effort follows a similar pattern, as shown in figure 2. In fact
ferent from that in FieldVCMH, according to a standard Mann-Whitney U test ðN1 5 4
N2 5 4, p 5 :25Þ.
FIG. 2.—Average individual casts per minute by period, FieldVCM and FieldPI ðL, H, and
Scr conditionsÞ.
1038 journal of political economy
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all six treatments yield similar effort levels. On average, the fishermen
cast their rod 0.63 times per minute in FieldPI, compared to 0.66 in
FieldVCM. Thus, figures 1 and 2 show no evidence of cooperation. The
support for result 1 provides the statistical basis for this claim.
Result 1. In our social dilemma experiment conducted in the field,
FieldVCM, no cooperation is observed.
Support for result 1. We first consider cooperation measured in terms
of catch. On average, the catch of fish is actually greater in the
FieldVCML, FieldVCMH, and FieldVCMScr treatments than in the cor-
responding FieldPIL, FieldPIH, and FieldPIScr treatments. A Mann-
Whitney test, taking each group’s activity over a session as one obser-
vation and comparing the catch of fish in the L sessions, fails to reject
the null hypothesis of equal catch between the FieldVCML and FieldPIL
treatments ðN1 5 4, N2 5 7, p 5 :14Þ. In the H sessions, the Mann-Whitney
test indicates that more fish are caught in the FieldVCMH treatment
than in FieldPIH ðN1 5 4, N2 5 4, p 5 :06Þ. In the Scr sessions, we also
reject the null hypothesis of equal catch in favor of the hypothesis that
7 Although higher, the number of fish caught in FieldVCMScr is not significantly dif-
,
catch is greater under FieldVCMScr than under FieldPIScr ðN1 5 4,
N 5 4, p 5 :02Þ.
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Consider now the effort measure. Here, the appropriate Mann-
Whitney test indicates no significant differences in casts per minute
between FieldVCM and FieldPI, in any of the three conditions: N1 5 4,
N2 5 7, p 5 :34 under L; N1 5 4, N2 5 4, p 5 :77 under H; and N1 5 4,
N2 5 4, p 5 :39 under Scr. There is no evidence of cooperation by either
of our two measures.8
Another place to look for evidence of cooperation is to consider the
effort levels associated with attempting to catch a second fish, condi-
tional on having caught one fish already in the current period. The
quota of catching two fish gives the fishermen the opportunity to co-
operate partially by catching one fish, thus enjoying fishing while still
earning money for the other members of one’s group. Such cooperation
would be revealed in lower effort in trying to catch a second fish in
FieldVCM than in FieldPI. However, we find no evidence of a difference
in effort to catch a second fish between FieldPI and FieldVCM ðMann-
Whitney test, N1 5 37, N2 5 52, p 5 :84Þ, taking as the unit of observa-
tion the average effort level of each subject over all per-period fishing in
all periods in which he caught one fish. QED
We thus find no evidence of cooperation in the FieldVCM treatment.
The differences in earnings between conditions in table 1, in particular
the considerable earnings in FieldVCML, reflect the relative difficulty of
catching fish in the low condition rather than the presence of cooper-
ation. We now consider whether there is a trend in cooperation over
time. The visual impression gained from figure 2 is that there is no
discernible trend in effort levels. For both catch and effort we test
whether the relevant measure of cooperation is different between early
and late periods, and the weight of the evidence favors result 2.
Result 2. There is no change in the level of cooperation over time.
Support for result 2. For purposes of this analysis, the early periods of
a session consist of periods 1 and 2, while periods 5 and 6 are considered
the late periods. The average group catch and effort over all groups in the
first two periods of the FieldPI treatment in a given condition are taken as
the zero cooperation baselines for early periods. Similar baselines are
constructed for the late periods. Using k5 fL,H, Scrg to denote the fishing
condition, the early baseline is subtracted from group catch in the first two
8 If a one-sided t-test, which is less conservative in rejecting null hypotheses, is applied, it
yields the following results. The difference in catch between the FieldVCM and FieldPI
treatments is significant in the low condition ðt 5 21:66, p 5 :07Þ, in the high condition
ðt 5 23:06, p 5 :01Þ, and in the Scr condition ðt 5 25:88, p < :01Þ. In all cases there are
more fish caught in the VCM than in the corresponding PI condition, which is inconsis-
tent with cooperation. As for the effort measure, the differences are not significant in the
low ðt 5 20:69, p 5 :25Þ, in the high ðt 5 20:30, p 5 :39Þ, and in the Scr conditions
ðt 5 20:62, p 5 :28Þ.
This content downloaded from 130.37.129.78 on Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:39:10 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
periods for each group in the FieldVCMk treatment separately and the late
baseline from group catch in periods 5 and 6 for each group in FieldVCMk.
1040 journal of political economyThus, the difference between each group’s catch ðeffortÞ in FieldVCMk
and the average catch ðeffortÞ in FieldPIk is an observation. If the catch
ðeffortÞ in an observation of FieldVCMk exceeds the average in FieldPIk,
we assign the observation a cooperation level of zero. We then test
whether cooperation is the same in the early and late periods in either
condition, treating each group’s catch as a matched pair.
For the catch measure, we find that the difference in cooperation be-
tween early and late periods is significant under L ðWilcoxon test, N1 5
N2 5 7, p 5 :05Þ but with a difference of only 0.10 fish between early and
late periods. Under H, we find an insignificant difference ðN1 5 N2 5 4,
p 5 :32Þ, as well as under Scr ðN1 5 N2 5 4, p 5 1Þ. For the effort mea-
sure, we find that the difference in cooperation between early and late
periods is insignificant under L ðWilcoxon test, N1 5 N2 5 7, p 5 :32Þ,
under H ðN1 5 N2 5 4, p 5 :58Þ, and under Scr ðN1 5 N2 5 4, p 5 :58Þ.9
QED
III. Bridging the Gap between the Laboratory and the FieldSection II shows that the pattern of cooperation in FieldVCM is very
different from the pattern of behavior observed in conventional VCM
experiments conducted in the laboratory. However, the two settings dif-
fer in several major aspects, and hence there are a number of candidate
causes for the differences in results. These include the subject pool
participating, whether the experiment is conducted within or outside the
laboratory, and characteristics of the game itself, such as the decision
variable ðfish or moneyÞ and the framing of the task. To isolate the effect
of the subject pool and the laboratory setting, we conduct three treat-
ments, called StuLab, FisherLab, and FisherPond. We will refer to these
collectively as the lab treatments because of their relatively close adher-
ence to traditional laboratory experimental procedures.
In subsection A we describe the procedures that are common to the
three treatments. Subsection B describes differences between the three
treatments. The results are presented in subsection C.
A. The Laboratory Version of Our Social Dilemma GameAs in the FieldVCM treatment, participants in the three lab treatments
were assigned to groups of four subjects. Each group’s composition re-
mained constant throughout its six-period session. Sessions were con-
ducted by hand using pen and paper. Participants were asked to decide
9 When a t -test is used, the difference is also insignificant at conventional levels in all
conditions.
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how many virtual fish to catch in each period, with a maximum of two
fish per period. Each fish that a participant decided to catch yielded her
from the lab to the field 1041a real cash payment of €1; each fish that the participant did not catch
yielded €0.50 to each of the other three groupmembers. The earnings of
an individual are given as follows:
pit 5 €1  xit 1 €0:50o
j ≠ i
ð22 xjtÞ; ð2Þ
where pit are the earnings in euros of subject i in period t, and xit ∈
f0; 1; 2g is the catch of subject i in period t. There is a dominant strategy
to catch two virtual fish, yielding individual payoffs of €2 per period. The
social optimum, with each group member receiving €3 per period, can be
reached only if all players choose to catch zero fish. The duration of a
session of the lab treatments takes about one-fourth of the duration of a
session of the field treatment. Therefore, earnings in the lab treatments
are scaled down by a factor of 4 to make the earnings comparable to those
in the field treatments.
In contrast to the traditional laboratory experiment, the language of
the instructions was contextualized to approximate a virtual implemen-
tation of the FieldVCM treatment. For example, the terms “fish,” “catch,”
and “pond” were used rather than terms such as “tokens,” “account,” and
“project.” After the instructions were read out loud, the participants had
to answer some test questions, which they answered without much diffi-
culty.
After eachperiod the experimenter informed all participants about the
decisions of every subject in the session. This was done by posting the
catch decisions of all participants, next to their identification numbers,
for all participants to see on a whiteboard in front of the room. This
meant that each subject was able to monitor and track every other indi-
vidual subject’s decisions over time. However, none of the subjects were
informed about which of the other session participants were in his own
group, and there were either 12 or 16 subjects in each session. This ap-
proximated the content and precision of the information available to
participants in the FieldVCM and FieldPI treatments, in which individ-
uals could observe others but did not know who was in their group. After
each period, subjects were informed, in private, of their earnings in that
period as well as of the sum of the total group catch. All communication
between participants was strictly forbidden, a rule that was well respected
in all sessions.
B. Constructing the Bridge from the Laboratory to the FieldThe first experiment, StuLab, was a conventional lab experiment con-
ducted with student participants in the Center for Economic ResearchThis content downloaded from 130.37.129.78 on Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:39:10 AM
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laboratory at Tilburg University. We specifically and exclusively invited
students with a Dutch nationality to participate. This restriction was
1042 journal of political economyintended to control for cultural factors, which could potentially influence
the results ðsee, e.g., Brandts, Saijo, and Schram 2004; Hermann, Tho¨ni,
and Ga¨chter 2008Þ. In total, 32 students participated in the StuLab ex-
periment, yielding eight groups of four subjects. All of the students
were economics, law, or psychology majors. On average, the participants
in this treatment earned €12.98 in the experiment.
The second lab experiment, FisherLab, was identical to the StuLab
experiment except for the subject population, who were customers of
De Biestse Oevers, the same subject pool sampled for the FieldVCM
and FieldPI treatments. Thus, FisherLab can be classified as an artifac-
tual field experiment according to the definitions of Harrison and List
ð2004Þ. The experiment was conducted in the restaurant of De Biestse
Oevers, which was temporarily transformed into an experimental lab.
We rearranged the restaurant so that it closely resembled a standard
experimental laboratory. We brought folding tables ðnormally used as
exam tables for students taking large-scale written examinations at Til-
burg UniversityÞ and placed them in rows well apart from each other.
This ensured that subjects could not read their neighbors’ decision
sheets. We installed a blackboard in front of the rows of tables, on which
we recorded their virtual catch decisions. We applied the procedures
customary to sessions conducted in our laboratory. In total, 32 fisher-
men participated in this experiment, comprising eight groups of four
participants, and thus yielding eight independent observations. On av-
erage, the participants in this experiment earned €13.65.
The third experiment, FisherPond, was identical to the FisherLab ex-
periment except that the FisherPond experiment was conducted while
participants were actually fishing at the pond. They performed the experi-
mental task ði.e., deciding how many virtual fish they wanted to catch
in each of the six periodsÞ in their original fishing location, and their
fishing was only briefly interrupted as they listened to the instructions
and indicated their decisions to the experimenter from time to time.
The physical environment in which the experiment took place was thus
the same in FisherPond and in FieldVCM, but the catch decisions per-
tained to virtual fish in the former treatment and to real fish in the latter
treatment.
Recruitment took place by approaching fishermen at the pond and
asking them if they would be willing to participate in a research study
conducted by Tilburg University. We deliberately approached fishermen
located at some distance from other participants in order to exclude
the possibility of participants contacting each other, and they were to
remain in their original locations during the experimental task. Once we
had recruited all participants for a session, the rules were explained toThis content downloaded from 130.37.129.78 on Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:39:10 AM
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all of them simultaneously at a central location. This was intended to
ensure common knowledge of comprehension of the task among all
from the lab to the field 1043participants. Participants were given a typed summary of the instructions
and listened to the experimenter reading aloud the full version of the
instructions. As in all other treatments, we used partner matching
throughout each session, but individuals were never informed about the
identity of the other members of their group.
After the instructions, the fishermen returned to their prior fishing
spots and resumed fishing. An experimenter circulated among the sub-
jects collecting their virtual catch decisions and providing information
about others’ virtual fishing decisions and outcomes, while the partici-
pants continued fishing. As in StuLab and FisherLab, participants were
informed privately, after each period, of the virtual catch decisions of all
other subjects in the session and their own earnings. They were also
notified, in private, about their earnings and about the sumof fish caught
by the three othermembers of their own group as in all other treatments.
After period 6 was completed, each participant was paid his earnings
and then continued fishing for the remainder of the morning. The
average earnings for the participants in this experiment were €14.30.
Table 2 summarizes the number of groups, main features, and average
individual earnings in the StuLab, FisherLab, and FisherPond experi-
ments.
C. Results in the StuLab, FisherLab, and FisherPond ExperimentsFigure 3 shows the average levels of cooperation over time in the three
lab experiments, StuLab, FisherLab, and FisherPond. Cooperation is
measured as the average number of virtual fish not caught per group.
That is, the level of cooperation is the maximum possible group catch in
a period, eight, minus the actual, albeit virtual, catch. The figure shows
that, as in prior controlled laboratory studies, the level of cooperation
among student subjects is positive in the early periods of the game and
decreases as the game progresses. We obtain the following result.TABLE 2
Number of Groups, Main Feature, and Average Individual Earnings
in the ðVirtual FishingÞ Lab Experiments.
xperiment Groups
Main Feature: Isolate
Effects of
Average
Earnings
tudents in the lab ðStuLabÞ 8 Contextualization €12.98
ishermen in the lab ðFisherLabÞ 8 Fishermen subject pool €13.65
ishermen at the pond ðFisherPondÞ 7 Laboratory setting €14.30E
S
F
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Result 3. Cooperation patterns in the StuLab experiment conform
to the usual patterns observed in the VCMgame as typically implemented
FIG. 3.—Levels of cooperation ðmaximum possible group catch minus actual catchÞ in
the lab experiments by period, averaged over all groups.
1044 journal of political economyin the laboratory. The lack of cooperation in FieldVCM is therefore not
due to the contextualization of the decision.
Support for result 3. Figure 3 shows that in early periods of the StuLab
experiments, students cooperate in the first period, but increasingly less
so in the later periods. A t-test shows that in the StuLab experiment, the
cooperation level is significantly different from zero in period 1 ðN 5 32,
p < :01Þ. In this test, the choice of an individual, rather than a group’s
average contribution, is taken as an independent observation ðbecause
in the first period, there are no intragroup dependencies resulting from
the history of playÞ. A Wilcoxon test comparing “early” and “late” play,
taking the group average contribution over periods 1 and 2 as an ob-
servation of early play and the group average over periods 5 and 6 as an
observation of late play, yields a p -value equal to .01 ðN1 5 N2 5 8Þ for the
StuLab experiment. Hence, cooperation decreases significantly over
time. QED
Thus, we find that the lack of cooperation in the first periods of the
field experiments is not a result of contextualization. Next, we test
whether the lack of cooperation found in FieldVCM is due to differences
in the subject pool. It may be the case that fishermen are systematically
less cooperative than students and that such a difference accounts for
the behavior we observe in the field treatments. However, when com-This content downloaded from 130.37.129.78 on Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:39:10 AM
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paring play in the StuLab and the FisherLab experiments—which are
identical except for the characteristics of the subjects that participate—
from the lab to the field 1045we find that, if anything, recreational fishermen are more cooperative
than students. This is reported as result 4.
Result 4. Cooperation is greater in FisherLab than in StuLab.
The lack of cooperation in FieldVCM is therefore not due to recreational
fishermen being intrinsically less cooperative than students.
Support for result 4. Figure 3 shows that students exhibit a lower level
of cooperation than the fishermen in the laboratory. This is supported by
a Mann-Whitney test ðN1 5 8, N2 5 8, p 5 :02Þ as well as a t-test ðt 5 2:87,
p 5 :01Þ that reject the hypothesis of equal cooperation.10 QED
Thus, the behavior of recreational fishermen in the laboratory ex-
periment is not predictive of their behavior in the field experiment. One
may argue that this is not unexpected because recreational fishermen
are likely to have competitive instincts—they will try to catch more fish
than their peers—and hence it is not surprising that we find no evidence
of cooperation in the field. On the other hand, it is striking that fish-
ermen act cooperatively, even more so than students, in a contextualized
laboratory experiment. A necessary condition for laboratory experi-
ments to be reliable tests of policy interventions is that people bring
their true preferences into the laboratory; comparison of the results of
FisherLab and FieldVCM suggests that this is not always the case.11
Furthermore, the above shows that subject pool composition alone
does not account for the lack of cooperation in FieldVCM: both students
and fishermen display positive levels of cooperation in the lab. We now
consider whether the laboratory setting itself has an effect on the co-
operation levels that the fishermen exhibit. We do so by comparing
behavior in the FisherLab and FisherPond experiments. These two ex-
periments are identical except that one is conducted in a synthetic envi-
ronment very similar to an experimental laboratory whereas the other is
conducted in more natural conditions, administered while subjects are
engaged in another activity. From this comparison, we obtain result 5.
10 Initial cooperation is also significantly different from zero for the FisherLab experi-
ment. The Student t -test shows that individual cooperation levels are significantly different
from zero in period 1 in the FisherLab experiment ðN 5 32, p < :01Þ. In this experiment,
average group cooperation decreases over time, but not significantly. A Wilcoxon test
comparing the group average of periods 1 and 2 to that of periods 5 and 6 yields a p -value
of .23 ðN1 5 N2 5 8Þ.
11 There is some evidence that high-sea professional fishermen, a distinct group from
recreational fishermen, are particularly competitive. Two quotes illustrate this point. An-
alyzing the catch decisions of Norwegian fishermen targeting blue whiting, Gezelius ð2007Þ
quotes a skipper stating that “½the choice of technology is not so much a question of cost,
but of fishingmore than your neighbor.” For a detailed analysis of the competitive spirits of
high-sea fishermen, see van Ginkel ð2009, 221–28).
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Result 5. Cooperation in the FisherPond experiment is greater than
in the FisherLab experiment. Cooperation is reduced by the laboratory
1046 journal of political economysetting.
Support for result 5. Figure 3 shows that the average level of cooper-
ation in the FisherPond experiment is higher than in FisherLab. A
Mann-Whitney test shows that this difference is statistically significant
ðN1 5 8, N2 5 7, p 5 :04Þ, as does a t -test ðt 5 2:43, p 5 :03Þ.12 QED
This result suggests that the formally structured laboratory setting
itself reduces cooperative behavior, at least for our subject pool of rec-
reational fishermen. Therefore, the fact that our experiment is con-
ducted outside of the laboratory cannot, on its own, account for the lack
of cooperation we have observed in FieldVCM. The difference between
FisherLab and FisherPond indicates that environmental cues can in-
fluence the extent to which social preferences are reflected in behavior.
IV. Is It the Activity or the Presence of Multiple Reward Media?The experiments reported in Section III show that the difference be-
tween our field experimental results and traditional laboratory results
persists when the effects of subject pool and the laboratory are removed.
The source of the discrepancy in results must lie in differences between
our field and the traditional laboratory implementations of the VCM.
While there are several substantive differences, we believe that the most
salient is the decision variable that must be modified in order to cooper-
ate. In FieldVCM, players cooperate by fishing less, whereas in the three
experiments described in Section III, they cooperate by giving upmoney.
There are two separate mechanisms whereby the decision variable could
affect the level of cooperation. The first is the possibility that the decision
variable itself influences cooperation. It may be that if a reduction in fish-
ing is required to achieve cooperation, individuals are less cooperative. The
second is that when group benefits and private costs of cooperation are
measured in different units, as in the FieldVCM treatment ðmoney vs. fish
not caught rather than the money vs. money trade-off in the lab experi-
mentÞ, individuals are less cooperative. Different units of account might
introduce self-serving biases in beliefs about the trade-offs between the two
units. For example, individuals may convince themselves that other players
prefer to fish rather than to have money and, thus, that failure to reduce
one’s own fishing is compatible with attaining the social optimum.
12 As in the other lab experiments, cooperation in the first round is also significantly
different from zero for the FisherPond experiment, as indicated by a standard t-test, taking
each individual catch decision as an independent observation ðN 5 28, p < :01Þ. In this
experiment there is also a significant decrease of cooperation over time. A Wilcoxon test
comparing the group average cooperation of periods 1 and 2 to that of periods 5 and 6
yields a p -value of .02 ðN1 5 N2 5 7Þ.
This content downloaded from 130.37.129.78 on Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:39:10 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
To investigate whether the decision variable is the key factor influ-
encing behavior and to distinguish between two possibilities given above
from the lab to the field 1047of the manner in which it influences behavior, we construct an addi-
tional framed field experiment, which we call FieldFT. Here, FT denotes
fishing time, the only reward medium present in this treatment.
A session of the FieldFT treatment consists of two parts, which take
place consecutively within the same session. Part 1 consists of three
periods of 30 minutes each, during which each participant is allowed to
catch at most two fish per period. Part 2 lasts for at most 150 minutes,
during which each participant is allowed to catch as many fish as he can,
receiving a financial bonus for each. However, the actual duration of
part 2 for each individual participant depends on how many fish each of
the three other members of his group caught in part 1.
At the beginning of part 1, two rainbow trout per participant, plus an
additional six trout, are put into the pond. In each session, 16 fishermen
participated, and hence we always threw in 38 fish at the start of a ses-
sion. The spot at which a participant fishes is assigned by a lottery. In
each of the three 30-minute periods, each fisherman is allowed to catch
up to two fish. After he catches a second fish within a period, the fish-
erman has to stop fishing and wait until the start of the next period. The
fisherman is allowed to keep all fish he catches, and he does not receive
any monetary payment in part 1. At the end of each period within part 1,
each fisherman is informed of the number of fish caught by each of the
other members of his group in the period. As was the case in the
FieldVCM and FieldPI treatments, the stock is replenished in every pe-
riod by throwing in the same number of fish that were caught in the
previous period. That means that the difficulty of catching a fish is
roughly the same in each period within part 1.
In part 2, participants are free to catch as many fish as they would like.
In addition to being allowed to keep the fish, individuals receive a bonus
of €2 for each fish that they catch. We keep the level of difficulty of
catching fish roughly constant within part 2 by replenishing the stock of
fish every 30 minutes, throwing in the same number of fish that were
caught in the preceding 30 minutes. Fishing in part 2 is thus more
attractive than fishing in part 1. Part 2 lasts longer ð150 minutes rather
than 90 minutes in part 1Þ, there is no constraint on the number of fish
one is allowed to catch ðas opposed to maximally two fish per half hourÞ,
and one receives €2 for every fish caught ðas opposed to receiving no
monetary rewardÞ.
The social dilemma is introduced by the imposition of the following
rule. Each fish that a fisherman catches in part 1 reduces the length of
time that each of the other threemembers of his group can fish in part 2,
by 10 minutes. Assuming that a fisherman has monotonically increasing
preferences over fish, fishing time, and money, fishing in part 2 is moreThis content downloaded from 130.37.129.78 on Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:39:10 AM
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valuable than in part 1. Prior to the FieldFT sessions, we administered
questionnaires with 21 fishermen. In the questionnaire, we asked fisher-
1048 journal of political economymen about their indifference point between catching six fish in 90 min-
utes and waiting 90 minutes and then fishing unconstrained for 150 min-
utes, earning €x per fish caught. As can be seen in Appendix B, 14 of the
21 would prefer waiting 90 minutes in order to be able to fish uncon-
strained for 150 minutes thereafter even if there is no monetary reward
for catching fish in part 2; only two fishermen indicated that they need to
receive more than €2 per fish caught in part 2 to prefer participating in
part 2 than in part 1. Therefore, we are confident that our parameteri-
zation induces a social dilemma.
The social optimum is attained if all group members catch no fish in
part 1. However, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium strategy for each
fisherman is to fish at full force in each period of part 1, since only other
group members are harmed if an individual catches a fish. If all parti-
cipants catch their maximum allowable quantity of two fish per period in
each of the three periods of part 1, each participant’s available fishing
time in part 2 is reduced from 150 to 0 minutes.13 The sessions were
conducted in April and May of 2010, and 12 groups of four subjects
participated in this treatment.
We compare catch and effort between parts 1 and 2 of the experiment.
In part 2, there are no negative externalities and there is even an ad-
ditional incentive to try to catch more fish ðthe individual bonus of €2
per fish caughtÞ. Thus, part 2 catch and effort correspond to the level of
activity that would exist if there was no cooperation. However, when
comparing effort in part 2 to that in part 1, we actually find that effort is
greater in part 1; see also figure 4. A similar result is obtained if period 3
is tested against part 2.
Result 6. In the FieldFT treatment, there is no evidence of coop-
eration. Average effort in part 1 is greater than that in part 2. The lack of
cooperation in FieldVCM is not due to the existence of different reward
media for selfish and cooperative behavior.
Support for result 6. We use a Wilcoxon matched pairs test, taking the
average effort level of a group in part 2 and either the average effort level
of that group over all three periods in part 1 or the average effort level of
that group in just the third period of part 1 as an independent pair.
Effort levels in part 1 are greater than in part 2 ðN1 5 N2 5 12, p < :01Þ if
all of part 1 is considered, as well as greater in period 3 of part 1 than in
part 2 ðN1 5 N2 5 12, p < :01Þ.
Furthermore, there is no evidence of partial cooperation. The effort
levels associated with trying to catch one’s first fish are not significantly
13 Because of the nonnegativity constraint, a participant’s fishing time in part 2 is set to
zero if the other three participants in his group catch, in total, more than 15 fish in part 1.
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different from those for the second fish in period 1 ðN1 5 N2 5 24
p 5 :71Þ, in period 2 ðN 5 N 5 15, p 5 :18Þ, or in period 3 ðN 5 N 5 9
FIG. 4.—Average individual casts per minute by period, FieldFT. On the horizontal axis
the numbers 1–3 denote the periods of part 1, while the average effort levels in part 2 ðor
period 4Þ are presented at 30-minute intervals.
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,1 2 1 2
p 5 :34Þ. QED
As was the case in FieldVCM, and in contrast to FisherLab and
FisherPond, we do not detect any cooperation in FieldFT.
V. ConclusionThe data from our framed field experiment are consistent with the
predictions of classical game theory. We find no evidence of cooperative
behavior. We detect no difference in behavior between a situation in
which refraining from fishing yields a large positive externality to the
group ðthe FieldVCM treatmentÞ and when it does not ðthe FieldPI
treatmentÞ. Indeed, if anything, there is some evidence that the so-
cial dilemma triggers negative cooperation. This conclusion contrasts
sharply with results from studies of the VCM game when it is imple-
mented in the laboratory. In such laboratory settings, cooperation is
typically positive at the outset of a group’s interaction and declines over
time. While the behavior of recreational fishermen may not be of spe-
cial economic interest in itself, it is striking to see the difference in their
behavior in the field compared to a contextualized laboratory environ-
ment.
Additional treatments allow us to explore potential causes of the dif-
ference between the results we have observed and those from previous
1050 journal of political economylaboratory studies. The treatments permit us to rule out four would-be
explanations: ðiÞ differences in contextualization between the game we
implemented in the field and the standard VCM implemented in the
laboratory, ðiiÞ differences in the subject pool ðstudents vs. recreational
fishermenÞ, ðiiiÞ differences between the settings in which the experi-
ments are conducted ðthe laboratory vs. a more natural environment,
the recreational fishing pondÞ, and ðivÞ differences in the units in which
the benefits and costs of cooperation are measured ðmoney vs. money or
money vs. fishÞ.
When implementing our modified version of the VCM game in the
laboratory using student subjects, we find a pattern of behavior very
similar to that typically observed in standard VCM lab experiments. In
addition, we find that using students as participants lowers cooperation
compared to our subject pool of recreational fishermen. This result is
consistent with those obtained by Charness and Villeval ð2009Þ, who
observe that students cooperate less than senior citizens in a laboratory
VCM game presented in neutral decontextualized terms. Therefore, the
use of students alone cannot account for the greater cooperation ob-
served in received laboratory experiments than in FieldVCM. Conduct-
ing the experiments in the structured and formal setting of an experi-
mental laboratory decreases cooperation among our subjects. They are
more cooperative when participating in a voluntary contributions game
while they are fishing than when they are in the laboratory. Therefore,
the fact that the experiment is conducted outside the laboratory cannot
on its own account for the lack of cooperation.
The most plausible remaining explanation for the difference between
our laboratory and field experiments is the nature of the decision vari-
able. Our subjects are unwilling to forgo fishing to yield benefits to the
group, even when group benefits are also in terms of fishing ðas evi-
denced by FieldFTÞ. Nevertheless, subjects from the same pool are will-
ing to cooperate if it involves sacrificing own monetary earnings for the
benefit of the group. Taken together, our data are consistent with the
assertion that cooperativeness dependson the decision variable, the activity
that must be modified in order to yield a benefit to the group. This state-
ment is not to deny the importance of other factors; for example, whether
similar results would apply to professional high-sea fishermen is an open
question.
Some readers of this paper have suggested that a demand effect may
exist in the experiment in that “fishermen participate in the experiment
to fish” and that when individuals find themselves at the fishing pond,
the desire to fish overwhelms the money that we offer the group not to
fish. However, we note that a similar effect exists with students whoThis content downloaded from 130.37.129.78 on Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:39:10 AM
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participate in traditional laboratory experiments: students presumably
participate in such experiments with the primary motivation of earning
from the lab to the field 1051money for themselves. While fishermen might be disposed to feel that
the pond is a place to fish, subjects in the laboratory presumably are
primarily disposed to view it as a place to earn money for themselves, in
equal measure. While some students also come to the laboratory to learn
some economics, some fishermen also have similar motives to learn
from others to improve their fishing technique. Social preferences, such
as the motive to increase social efficiency, have been shown to exist in
student subjects; there is no reason to suppose ex ante that such motives
would not be present among the fishermen. Indeed, the FisherLab and
FisherPond treatments show that these motives are at least as strong
among the fishermen as the students when such motives are measured
with the same game. Furthermore, in the FieldFT treatment, payoffs are
entirely in terms of fishing. Reducing one’s own fishing increases the
overall fishing opportunities available to the group. Thus, the trade-off is
fully in terms of the reward medium that is typically associated with the
venue. As described earlier, we find no cooperation in FieldFT, in agree-
ment with standard economic theory, indicating that a demand effect of
the type described above could not account for the lack of cooperation
that we observe.
It has been shown in some field experiments that decentralized co-
operation can be successful ðsee, e.g., Erev et al. 1993; Bandiera et al.
2005Þ. Cooperation can be found in naturally occurring social dilemma
situations as well ðsee, e.g., Ostrom 1990Þ. However, our results suggest
that this successful cooperation does not spontaneously arise. When
there is no contact possible between agents facing a social dilemma, the
mere presence of potential group-level gains resulting from the sacrifice
of private payoffs does not guarantee cooperation—even if the group
concerned is small in number. The propensity to cooperate appears to
depend on the nature of the activity that individuals must undertake, or
refrain from, in order to increase group payoffs.14
It may be the case that to reliably achieve cooperation in a setting such
as ours, some additional structure is required. This structure might be an
effective avenueof communicationbetween individuals ðIsaac andWalker
14 Results that are similar in spirit, i.e., showing that the extent to which social prefer-
ences appear depends on the decision variable, are reported in Fershtman, Gneezy, and List
ð2008Þ. They consider a dictator and a modified trust game. In one set of treatments, in-
dividuals allocate a pool of money within a traditional laboratory implementation of these
two games ðsee, e.g., Forsythe et al. 1994; Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995Þ. In another set,
individuals earn a greater share of the money to be divided with better performance in a
real effort task, in essence framing the game as a competition over resources. The results show
that players do indeed behave more competitively in the real effort task condition. The
authors offer the interpretation that the presence of different norms in the two situations
accounts for the difference in the influence of social preferences on decisions.
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1988aÞ, a system of punishment of noncooperators ðFehr and Ga¨chter
2000Þ, or a mechanism for increasing and maintaining social pressure
1052 journal of political economyðGa¨chter and Fehr 1999; Masclet et al. 2003Þ or strengthening group
identity ðEckel and Grossman 2005; Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini
2007; Chen and Li 2009Þ. All of these factors have been found to increase
the level and sustainability of cooperation in laboratory social dilemmas. It
is thus reasonable to conjecture that the presence of one ormore of these
instruments may be necessary, or at least make it more likely, to achieve
cooperation in some inhospitable field settings, such as the one we have
studiedhere. Itmay also be the case that if the trade-off between individual
incentives and group payoffs were altered so that it became less costly to
cooperate, perhaps by increasing the €2 externality to others from not
catching a fish to a much larger amount, then some cooperation would
arise. On the otherhand, cooperationmay be so difficult to achieve in our
setting that even the introduction of the instruments just described or
changing the incentives to cooperate may not be effective.Appendix AStatistical Analysis of the Effect of Effort on Catch
This appendix shows that the number of casts per minute, our effort measure of
cooperation, is correlated with the number of fish caught, which is used to
calculate our catch measure of cooperation. Thus, we establish that effort is a
legitimate measure of cooperation: a higher casting frequency increases ex-
pected private payoff and decreases expected group payoff.
An ordered probit model is used to estimate the effects of fishing effort on the
number of fish caught, as presented in table A1. The dependent variable is an
individual’s catch of fish in a period. The table contains estimates of the pooled data
from the FieldVCM and FieldPI treatments ðin all three conditions H, L, and ScrÞ.
TABLE A1
Relationship between Individual Effort and Individual CatchDependent Variable: Number of Fish Caught in a Period
Variable Estimate
Effort .742***
ð.277Þ
IðH ConditionÞ 1.451***
ð.123Þ
IðScr ConditionÞ 1.207***
ð.180Þ
Quadrant fixed effects Yes
Observations 648
Pseudo-R 2 .1465
Note.—Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, are reported in
parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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The model shows a clear positive and significant effect of our measure of effort,
casts per minute, on the catch of fish. The variables IðHigh ConditionÞ and I(Scr
from the lab to the field 1053Condition) have a value of one when an observation is taken from the corre-
sponding condition. The quadrant fixed effects are dummy variables that capture
the position at the pond at which a fisherman is fishing. The quadrant dummy
variables are insignificant, indicating that the position at which an individual fishes
has no influence on his catch of fish.
Appendix BSurvey about the Value of Fishing in FieldFT
In this appendix we present the questionnaire that we used in the FieldFT
treatment to determine whether a social dilemma existed and the responses we
obtained.
The QuestionnaireDear fisherman,
On behalf of Tilburg University we would like your cooperation in filling out
a questionnaire. We ask you to indicate which of the following two options is your
preferred option.
Option 1 Option 2
Fish for 1.5 hours and catch Wait for 1.5 hours at your fishing spot and then fish as
at most 6 fish
Fish for 1.5 hours and catch
at
Fish
at
. . .
. . .
Fish
at
Results of the Questionnaire
This content dowmuch as you want for 2.5 hours
Wait for 1.5 hours at your fishing spot and then fish asmost 6 fish much as you want for 2.5 hours, receiving €0.50 for each
fish caughtfor 1.5 hours and catch
most 6 fishWait for 1.5 hours at your fishing spot and then fish as
much as you want f or 2.5 hours, receiving €1 for each fish
caught. . .
. . .
Wait for 1.5 hours at your fishing spot and then fish asfor 1.5 hours and catch
most 6 fish much as you want for 2.5 hours, receiving €15 for each fish
caughtA social optimum of no fishing in periods 1–3 is induced if fishermen prefer to
wait for 1.5 hours in order to fish on an unlimited basis for 2.5 hours while
receiving €2 per fish caught. Table B1 shows the results of the questionnaire. In
total, we have surveyed 21 fishermen.
Table B1 shows that 19 out of 21 fishermen claimed to be better off waiting for
1.5 hours and then fishing on an unconstrained basis for 2.5 hours and being
paid €2 for each fish caught. We are therefore confident that our experimental
parameterization induced the social dilemma we sought to create.nloaded from 130.37.129.78 on Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:39:10 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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